Key Terms

The Geneva Accords of 1954 created the independent states of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The Geneva Conference was convened to discuss both the lingering issues of the Korean War and the Indochina issue, but the legacy of the conference was the agreement produced regarding Vietnam. With a goal of ending the war between France and the Viet Minh, the conference began discussions of Indochina on May 8, 1954, the day after the French defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Representatives from the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, France, Cambodia, Laos, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and the State of Vietnam (a small southern polity under former emperor Bao Dai, which received Western backing) all took part in the conference. On July 20, 1954, France signed a cease-fire agreement with the DRV, Laos, and Cambodia which granted independence to all three while partitioning Vietnam at the seventeenth parallel between the southern State of Vietnam (soon transformed into the Republic of Vietnam) and the northern Democratic Republic of Vietnam. For 300 days, the peoples of both nations were granted unrestricted movement to adjust to the new political situation. Hundreds of thousands migrated during this time, particularly Catholics wary of the communist North. The Geneva Accords also called for a 1956 general election across Vietnam as part of a peaceful reunification plan. The general election was never held. 

The domino theory formed a staple of the U.S. justification for war in Vietnam. Building on Cold War tensions, American leaders watched warily as Eastern Europe fell to communist control. Fearful of similar events transpiring in Southeast Asia, Washington buttressed its Asian allies and worked to strengthen the American position across the Pacific. The general fear suggested that if one Asian nation were to fall to communism, then a neighboring nation would suddenly find itself coming under the communist yoke, and it too would fall. The process would eventually continue until all of Asia was under communist influence. For an American nation fearful of losing ground in a global strategic battle, one only needed to point to Soviet influence in China, and China’s subsequent influence in Korea, followed by the rising communist power in Vietnam to prove the point. Logically, it could be assumed that if Vietnam were to fall to communism, then Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and perhaps more nations would become communist as well. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson both cited the principle of the domino theory in explaining the need for American involvement in Vietnam, and the theory continues to define the discussion of American involvement in the war. 

The Ho Chi Minh Trail was the principal supply route by which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam funneled supplies and troops south into the Republic of Vietnam. The path was not one singular road, but rather a series of roads, bridges, trails, and depots that formed a network into the South. Continual construction was carried out with Soviet and Chinese support, turning the initially rough trail into a veritable gateway to the south, albeit a well-concealed one. The trail snaked through Laos and Cambodia, entering South Vietnam primarily in the Central Highlands. Movement along the route was conducted primarily at night, and trucks stopped in camouflaged posts along the way to avoid American bombing. Through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the Viet Cong fighters in the South remained well-supplied and received reinforcements from the North. American officials frequently bombed the trail with extraordinarily high amounts of explosives, but could never more than temporarily stop the flow of supplies. The trail was always quickly repaired and reinforced, often with anti-aircraft weaponry. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was never destroyed and proved to be one of the ultimate logistical advantages the North held over its enemies. 

Body count rhetoric dominated the American mission in Vietnam, and has been heavily controversial ever since. The United States arrived in South Vietnam to ensure the republic’s survival, but never aimed to conquer North Vietnam. The Vietnam War thus could not be measured in miles gained or territory conquered. American military leaders decided to measure progress in the war in terms of casualty figures. The thinking went that in a war of attrition, the communist Vietnamese would be worn down by superior American firepower and forced to submit. An attrition strategy hoped to kill communist forces faster than they could be replaced, and as such, American planners felt that they needed to keep track of the numbers of Vietnamese killed so that they could gauge the progress towards breaking their enemy. Leaders like Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, himself a lifelong advocate for quantitative methodology, influenced the body count idea and defined American success in terms of enemy dead. The body count rhetoric in some ways encouraged American soldiers to kill as many of the “enemy” as they could. Performance was measured by a unit’s measured fatalities, which led some units to inflate their numbers artificially or count civilians towards their numbers. 

The Mekong Delta was one of the vital agricultural and economic sectors of the Republic of Vietnam. Located in the southern portion of the country, the Mekong Delta forms the spot where the 2,700 mile Mekong River finally reaches the South China Sea, creating a vast – and highly fertile – 26,000 square mile river delta. The Mekong Delta, south of Saigon and far removed from the demilitarized zone at the 17th parallel, was nonetheless the scene of heavy fighting as Viet Cong soldiers infiltrated into the region from Cambodia. Early in the war, communist shipping made use of the river system to move supplies and the Viet Cong exploited the citizens of the Delta region for taxes, food, and assistance. During the Tet Offensive, particularly fierce and widespread fighting occurred in the Delta’s numerous villages. In order to patrol the many waterways, the U.S. Navy operated a fleet of patrol boats that inspected shipping and provided assistance to land operations. These patrol boats began operating in the Mekong Delta in 1965, and managed to secure large portions of the area. Navy patrols continued for the rest of the war, and patrols of the delta were eventually handed over to sailors of the South Vietnamese navy as the United States withdrew from Vietnam. 

Although this website is largely concerned with the military aspects of the Vietnam War, the anti-war movement in the United States cannot be ignored, especially given the powerful role it played in shaping American policy in Vietnam. A massive part of the counter-culture movement of the 1960s, opposition to the war expanded greatly over the course of the decade. Groups like the Students for a Democratic Society and other New Left organizations were often found at the forefront of these protests, which began in earnest in 1965 as the U.S. began full-scale combat involvement in Vietnam. The anti-war movement could be found in nearly every city nationwide, as college campuses from California to Michigan to the East Coast formed hotbeds of protest. In the presidential election of 1968, the anti-war movement became a mainstream issue, though the movement was still marred by chaos – the 1968 Democratic National Convention reflected both the disorder caused by many protestors and the ferocity of their convictions. Representatives and senators began to publically question the course of the war in earnest. Nixon gained the presidency on a promise to end the war, but his seeming expansion of the conflict though the 1970 invasion of Cambodia sparked even stronger protests, leading to a confrontation between protestors and Ohio National Guard troops at Kent State in May which left four students dead. In all, the anti-war movement did not represent every American, nor did it singlehandedly end the war – it did, however, put significant pressure on U.S. politicians and play a large role in shaping the culture of the era. 

Agent Orange was one of the principal defoliants used by American forces in Vietnam. The thick jungle environment of Vietnam impaired the ability of American forces to track and locate Viet Cong infiltrators in the South. As such, from 1961 until 1972, the U.S. Air Force carried out Operation Ranch Hand wherein defoliants were sprayed around military bases and main supply routes in order to deny cover to Viet Cong troops. Defoliants were also used over large swaths of rural Vietnam and used to attack crops. The operation eventually expanded to include aerial and land-based defoliant usage. Millions of acres of land would eventually be sprayed with herbicides as part of the overall defoliant program. Agent Orange, which like many of the herbicides used derived its name from the color marking its container, was the most commonly used of all defoliants. Agent Orange contained the highly toxic chemical dioxin. In the years following the Vietnam War, the ill-effects of Agent Orange became readily apparent as many American veterans and their children suffered terrible health problems. The ills of Agent Orange were most heavily felt by the Vietnamese people, tens of thousands of whom were born with horrible birth defects or suffered increased cancer rates. The use of Agent Orange remains one of the most controversial and damaging legacies of the Vietnam War for the United States. 

Resources available to service members exposed to Agent Orange

Atrocities were a common occurrence in Vietnam as they are in all wars, and neither side emerged clean from the conflict. The Viet Cong relied on intimidation to force their power over the South, and thousands of civilians were kidnapped, tortured, or murdered by Viet Cong soldiers as part of a general campaign to break the spirit of the Republic of Vietnam. Villagers were harassed by the Viet Cong and forced into non-cooperation with American forces, while civilians in cities were subject to frequent terror attacks. During the Tet Offensive, the city of Huế was occupied by communist forces and thousands of civilians were systematically executed in one of the most horrific atrocities of the war. Viet Cong and People's Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese) soldiers alike killed and tortured many Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and American prisoners. For their own part, ARVN troops were prone to taking few prisoners, and executed many captured communist troops. The vast majority of American forces avoided committing atrocities, but some American soldiers and officers were guilty of committing violent acts against the civilian population. Many incidents went unreported. The My Lai Massacre stands out as one of the most egregious American actions of the war, as over 500 civilians (men, women, and children) were executed by a U.S. Army Company on March 16, 1968. Only Lt. William Calley received judicial punishment for the act. Additionally, aerial bombardments killed tens of thousands of civilians in the North and South, the use of defoliant chemicals wrought horrendous health effects on civilians, and bombardment with cluster bombs left behind munitions that still pose a danger today. In all, the Vietnam War shared a common characteristic with most previous wars as the civilian population suffered the most death and destruction.  

Battle of Huế

Vietnam Atrocities

Laos and Cambodia were both independent nations at the end of the Geneva Conference in 1954, and each had a strong communist element. With support from the North Vietnamese, these groups grew in strength. The Laotian Pathet Lao fought against the Western backed Kingdom of Laos in a prolonged conflict from 1953 until 1975. The North Vietnamese People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) relied on Laos as the nation was home to a significant portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Troops and supplies were stationed in great quantities in Laos, which led the United States to heavily bomb sections of the nation. The Pathet Lao would eventually seize control of Laos in 1975, establishing the People’s Democracy of Laos. In Cambodia, North Vietnamese troops and the Viet Cong established bases in the country to infiltrate the Mekong Delta in the south of the Republic of Vietnam. The Kingdom of Cambodia (later the Khmer Republic) received American backing in its fight against the communist Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot. American warplanes had begun bombing Viet Cong forces in Cambodia secretly in 1965, but under President Nixon these bombings intensified. These secret bombings gave way to an invasion of Cambodia in late April 1970. The invasion was designed to strengthen ARVN forces, bide time for Vietnamization, and strengthen the Cambodian government. In the end, the invasion further destabilized Cambodia and prompted a harsh backlash from the American public, leading to the Kent State shootings on May 4. By June 30, all American forces had withdrawn from Cambodia.

Learn More About Laos 

Learn More About Cambodia

Vietnamization was the central Vietnam policy of Richard Nixon’s presidency. The policy revolved around the strengthening of the Republic of Vietnam, specifically its military forces, and the pacification of South Vietnam’s countryside to add stability to the nation. Vietnamization was designed to leave the Republic of Vietnam stable and equipped with an effective fighting force as the U.S. began full-scale withdrawal from Vietnam. Ideally, the policy would allow the United States to hand over combat responsibilities directly to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). In many ways, Vietnamization reflected a return to the original American advisement and support for South Vietnam that characterized the conflict before President Johnson escalated American involvement in 1965. Vietnamization called for an end to U.S. ground combat, but in many cases intensified American air operations. American forces did withdraw under Nixon, but his stated policy of ending the war was questioned by the American public with the invasion of Cambodia in 1970. Nonetheless, Vietnamization continued through the Paris Peace Accords and the American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. While the policy did allow for the Americans to withdraw from Vietnam and did leave a more capable ARVN, the South Vietnamese military still remained heavily reliant on American airpower, as the 1972 Easter Offensive showed. Without American support, ARVN forces were unable to effectively resist the North Vietnamese. 

The Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 27, 1973, bringing an end to the American combat mission in Vietnam. Peace talks had begun during the Johnson Administration as American and North Vietnamese officials met in Paris in May 1968. Negotiations were slow and were often held up over procedural issues; a fierce debate over the shape of the table reflected the immense difficulty that the negotiators faced. Secret negotiations had begun in 1969 between Henry Kissinger and Lê Đức Thọ which took place outside the main negotiating effort. An agreement was announced in October 1969, but difficulties soon emerged and the agreement stood risk of failure. After the conclusion of further negotiations and Linebacker II, an American heavy bombing operation, the North Vietnamese were brought back to the negotiating table. The work of Kissinger and Lê Đức Thọ would form the basis for the peace accords. The “Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam” stipulated that all American forces would withdraw from Vietnam in 60 days and that all American prisoners would be returned by the North Vietnamese. Additionally, a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord was set to be formed to provide the Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (the political arm of the Viet Cong) with a forum for political discourse, elections, and a gradual plan for reunification – this part of the accords never occurred. Aside from the American withdrawal and release of prisoners, the accords failed to save South Vietnam.