Voiceover: This program is sponsored by Colonel Illinois Jennifer N. Pritzker, Illinois National Guard Retired and the United States World War I Centennial Commission. (Theme music)
Voiceover: The following is a production of the Pritzker Military Museum and Library. Bringing citizens and citizen soldiers together through the exploration of military history, topics, and current affairs, this is Pritzker Military Presents. (Applause)
Clarke: Welcome to Pritzker Military Presents with Professor Noriko Kawamura and a discussion of her book Turbulence in the Pacific: Japanese-US Relations in World War I. I'm your host Ken Clarke, and this program is coming to you from the Pritzker Military Museum and Library in downtown Chicago, and it's sponsored by Colonel Illinois Jennifer N. Pritzker, Illinois Army National Guard Retired, and the United States World War I Centennial Commission. This program and hundreds more are available on demand at PritzkerMilitary.org. Although military events in East Asia were overshadowed by the battles in Europe during WWI, what happened there shattered the accord between the Allies, Japan, and the United States. In her book Turbulence in the Pacific, Professor Noriko Kawamura examines the two-fold question of how and why US-Japanese tensions developed into antagonism during the Great War. This complex phenomena was influenced by several factors: conflicts of national interest both geopolitical and economic, perceptual problems such as miscommunication, miscalculation, and mistrust, and most important of all incompatible approaches to foreign policy. America's idealistic internationalism clashed with Japan's regionalism and the pluralism that derived from its strong sense of racial identity and anti-western nationalist sentiments. By looking at the motives and circumstances behind Japanese expansionist policy in East Asia, Professor Kawamura raises serious questions about the effectiveness of American foreign policy with Japan during WWI. At the close of the Twentieth century after fifty years of cold war, those in search of a new world order lean toward Wilsonian rhetoric. In her book Kawamura suggests that it can be unwise to apply a universalistic and idealistic approach to international conflicts that often result from extreme nationalism, regionalism, and racial rivalry. Noriko Kawamura is an associate professor of history at Washington State University. Her research focuses on the history of war, peace, and diplomacy in the pacific world. She teaches the history of US foreign relations, US/ East Asian relations, US military history, and modern Japanese history. She is also the president of the Asian studies on the Pacific coast. Kawamura is the author of Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War. She also coedited Building New Pathways To Peace and Toward a Peaceable Future: Redefining Peace, Security, and Kyosei From a Multidisciplinary Perspective. She is currently working on a new book about Emperor Hirohito's cold war. Please join me in welcoming to the Pritzker Military Museum and Library Professor Noriko Kawamura. (Applause)
Kawamura: thank you, Mr. Clarke. Thank you for coming. I also would like to thank Colonel Pritzker for inviting me to Chicago all the way from Pullman, Washington. It took a day, one-day trip, to get here. It is a great honor for me to be able to talk about my first book, Turbulence in the Pacific, which was published in 2000 in order to commemorate the centennial of WWI. WWI was fought primarily by European powers for European reasons. But my book is not about Europe. My book focuses on two non-European powers, the United States and Japan. They were emerging as major power on two sides of the Pacific. I examine how WWI impacted the Asian Pacific world and looks at unintended consequences of the war. The outbreak of WWI initially looked like a
contingent factor in Asia. However, by the time—by the end of the war it appeared that structural change in the Pacific was taking place. Like many historians my interest in US-Japanese relations began with the violent clash in the Second World War, not the First, in the Pacific theater. It started with Japanese invasion of China, and then Pearl Harbor attack, and ended with atomic bomb. Naturally I wondered what led to these tragic events. As I followed the trajectory of US-Japanese relations I realized that the First World War became an important turning point in their relations. Although they fought on the same side, their relations deteriorated during the war. There were continuities and escalation of tension between the two countries from the first war to the second. So I examined in my book, the Turbulence in the Pacific, how and why antagonism grew between the two during WWI. I also want to add that my first book on WWI paved the groundwork for my recent book on WWII, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War. First I would like to talk about how to interpret the nature of US-Japanese rivalry at the time of WWI as a sort of concept. In order to understand the US-Japanese relations and particularly the disagreements developing, we need to consider various reasons such as geopolitical and national interests, economic interests and so forth, and also racial and cultural divides as perceived a century ago. Widely accepted explanation of Japanese American estrangement emphasized their rivalry over China, and that continued for many decades afterward. It is important to remember that during the decades prior to WWI Western imperial powers colonized most of Asia, and China and the Qing Dynasty was weak. Western imperial powers colonized most of Asia, and as you can see in the map the Great Britain, Russia, France, and Germany divided China into spheres of influence. Britain along the Yangtze River, the artery of Chinese economy, and Russia spheres influence was in Northern Manchuria, adjacent to Russian Siberia. And France claimed Southern France—I'm sorry, Southern China adjacent to French Indochina. And here it is an important spot. Germany claimed Shandong Province with the Qingdao, and excellent harbor. Japan escaped colonization by western powers, but in order to survive as a nation Japan felt it had to build its own empire. So Japan became a latecomer in the imperialist competition in China. The United States on the other hand moved away from formal colonization—sorry. US moved away from formal colonization practice after the bitter experience in the Philippines and became a champion of open-door policy in China. The open-door principles included both equal commercial opportunity in China and the territorial and administrative integrity of China. The outbreak of WWI in Europe crystallized the US-Japanese controversy over China. Of course Japan became an opportunistic, imperialist aggressor in China, and the united states and the president, Woodrow Wilson, emerged as a moralistic champion over the open door and the protector of the territorial integrity of China. My book follows that line of standard interpretation. However, my book also suggests that there was an additional dichotomy behind the clash between Japan's European-style imperialism and America's Wilsonian, anti-colonial, liberal internationalism. Japan as an Asian nation was developing a regionalistic sort of mission in Asia, slogan under Asia for Asians, which was driven by its strong sense of racial identity as Asian and also anti-Western, anti-nationalistic sentiments. President Wilson's America, on the other hand, exhibited the attitude that I categorize as universalism and unilaterialism. I also have a problem pronouncing it. The Wilsonian administration assumed that America's ideals of freedom and democracy were universal values that everyone must embrace. President Wilson began to apply his ideals of liberal international unilaterally to the rest of the world without fully understanding the reality of the outside world. It is hard to argue that the Wilson administration was familiar with the situation in Japan or China at that time. To be sure history clearly shows how Japan's self-deceiving expansionist policy in Asia and the Pacific region led the country astray in the 1940s. However, I wonder if we really
understand how president Wilson’s unilateral approach to international relations affected the world. I therefore examined the effectiveness of Wilsonian policy in dealing with the challenges that Japanese empire posed in the Asian Pacific region during WWI. My book was published in 2000, before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but my book already pointed out possible shortcomings and dangers of unilateral foreign policy carried out under the rhetoric of universal idealism of freedom and democracy. So much for the general conceptual framework of my book. Now let us look at how the events unfolded in the Pacific during WWI and how and why US-Japanese relations deteriorated. Before August 1914 when war broke out in Europe, Japan had annexed Korea and secured South Manchuria as its sphere of influence, but Japan had not established its foothold in China south of the Great Wall. Here is the red to the border on the map, that's the part of the Great Wall. So Japan only had north of the great Wall in the area of South Manchuria. That was Japan's sphere of influence, but not in the South. The outbreak of war in Europe in august of 1914 was a one-in a million chance for Japan to expand its empire. European belligerent powers were preoccupied with the war in Europe, and China after the 1911 revolution was deeply divided and weak. As an ally of Great Britain, Japan immediately declared war on Germany, and within three months Japan occupied German leased territory in Shandong Province in China; the main target was Qingdao, which was an excellent harbor, probably the best in the north of the Yangtze River. The Japanese navy also occupied the German Pacific Islands. Those are the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Marshalls Notice the location of US Guam territory on the map. It was very close to the island chain of the Marianas. You can easily imagine how the US Navy felt from Hawaii to the Philippines, Marianas and Marshalls and Carolines were in-- blocking the whole US sea route. Then in January 1915 Japan issued the infamous Twenty-One Demands on China. What the Japanese leaders, especially the Japanese General's staff, tried to do with this was to use the Japanese occupation of Shandon peninsula as a pretext to establish Japan's supremacy in China and act as the dominant power in East Asia. The sweeping Twenty-One demands included not only the transfer of German-leased territories in Shandong to Japan, but also the extension of Japan's leasehold in South Manchuria and Japan's special rights in southeastern China close to Taiwan. Taiwan at that time was already Japan’s colony. Obviously Japan's regionalist aspirations were contradictory. While Japanese leaders claimed to build a special relationship with China, they treated China as an inferior partner and exploited China with intimidation. When China resisted the Twenty-One Demands, Japan sent an ultimatum and forced China to sign it. On the issue of the disposition of German rights in Shandong, China eventually had to agree to give Japan a free hand in its negotiation with Germany. Japan of course intended to take over all German rights and accrue sessions in Shandong at the future peace conference. Unfortunately Japan's gains through the Twenty-One Demands came at a high price. President Wilson called the Japanese demands "a suspicious business" and emerged as a protector of the open door and the independence of China. Events thus became a turning point in US-Japanese relations. Japan wanted to settle issues strictly between China and Japan without US interference, but President Wilson and US Ambassador Paul Reusch were eager to defend China and its open door from Japan's aggressive demands. The United States declared that it would not recognize any agreement between Japan and China that would violate the open-door policy and the US treaty rights in China. Incidentally, the United States used a similar no-recognition policy later when Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931. Exactly one hundred years ago, that is March 1917, it became a major turning point in WWI in many ways. The United States was standing on the threshold of war with Germany. Having severed diplomatic ties with Germany in response to Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare, President Wilson and his
cabinet unanimously endorsed US entry into the war against Germany on March 20, 1917, and Congress declared war on April 6. And one year later, spring 1918 as you know, US soldiers were fighting on the other side of the Atlantic for the first time in its history. I should also add that March 1917 was a critical time in Russia as well. The first revolution broke out on March 8, 1917 and overthrew Tsarist government. Then the Bolshevik revolution in Red October followed and established the first Communist government. Consequently Soviet Russia withdrew from the Great War in spring 1918, and the Eastern Front collapsed. This by the way created a new US-Japanese controversy in Russian Siberia, which I will discuss later. Going back to the Pacific theater, the US entry into the war against Germany turned out to be another critical point in US-Japanese relations. President Wilson's symbolic appeal to neutral states to follow US example and break ties with Germany further accelerated US-Japanese rivalry over China. This time the question was who should take initiative in leading China into the war. China's entry into war was important to Japan for several reasons. It offered Japan the opportunity to make China Japan's ally by extending military and industrial loans to China. This way Japan could legitimately assert its supremacy over China. Through this at the future conference Japan could force China to act Japan—to accept Japan's claim to German rights in Shandong. And this was important because Japan now knew that United States would have a seat in the peace conference as well. President Wilson on the other hand wanted to help China and shield China against its selfish neighbor. But the Wilson administration's problem was how to do it. In order for China to follow US lead and go over to US side, China required financial and even military assistance from the United States. But President Wilson doubted that US Congress and US bankers would make any commitment. Neither US politicians nor business community had stakes enough to justify spending money for China. We must remember that after spring 1917 US had to mobilize the entire nation to fight war against Germany across the Atlantic. As China continued to suffer from internal division, the Japanese and General Masatake Terauchi extended financial and military support to the government in Beijing, and the Beijing government eventually declared war on Germany in August 1917 and Japan's auspices. This was the beginning of Japan's experiment with the idea of a Japanese-led regionalism in East Asia based on an equal partnership with China. Ironically General Terauchi employed the slogan Kyoson-Kyoei—in English, Coexistence and Co-prosperity. That sort of sounds familiar later in greater East Asia—co-prosperity sphere during WWII. Some Japanese even began to talk about the Asian Monroe Doctrine. In summer 1917 when Japan sent Special Ambassador Kikujiro Ishii as a head of war mission to the United States. One of the main objectives of Ishii was to secure US recognition of Japan's paramount interest in China. However, the United States was more interested in securing Japan's adherence to the open door in China. Tow negotiators from both sides, Ambassador Ishii and US Secretary of State Robert Lansing undertook the impossible task of reaching a diplomatic agreement to settle irreconcilable differences for over two months. In the end they signed a wartime measure, sort of a window dressing agreement, to create an appearance of harmony, but in reality to agreement contained two incompatible ideas. Untied States recognized Japan's special interests in China, and Japan promised to adhere to the principle of open door and independence of China. As a footnote, I would like to mention that while the negotiation was deadlocked in Washington D.C. President Wilson's personal advisor Colonel Edward House and Secretary Lansing thought of a realistic concession to Japan by creating a tripartite trusteeship for China consisting of trustees from China, Japan, and Western powers. House' reason for this realistic idea is noteworthy. He hoped to use US concessions in China in order to curb Japanese immigration to the United States. In 1910s and 20s anti-Japanese immigration movement in the west coast, especially in
California, was becoming a politically explosive issue within the United States and also in US and Japanese diplomatic relations. If US door was closed to Japan Japanese immigrants, Colonel House thought, they had to go somewhere else like China. Here was a possible realistic compromise, but it was never followed through. Wilson never mentioned it. Eventually in 1924, by the way, US Congress banned Japanese immigration all together in the so-called Japanese Exclusion Act. This act of racial discrimination shocked even Japanese leaders who had been sympathetic to the US up to that point, and many of them turned their back against the United States with disillusionment. In retrospect the realistic compromise of Colonel House in 1917 might have been worth exploring, but that was just a footnote. Now let me move to the subject of Siberian invention in 1918. This could have been a rare opportunity for US and Japan to cooperate. However, when they launched a joint military expedition of Vladivostok, they suffered serious miscommunication and miscalculations, and their distrust of each other even increased further. On November 7, 1917 the day the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was made public, in Russia the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd. Russia’s withdrawal from the war and the collapse of the Eastern Front prompted the British and the French to urge Japan and the United States to reestablish an Eastern Front by sending troops from Vladivostok through the Trans-Siberian Railroad. But neither Japan nor the United States were interested in such venture. Certainly the overthrow of Tsarist government in Russia and discovers of triumph of Bolshevism in Russia especially scared and shocked the Japanese leaders, particularly the Japanese army. Japan had just renewed the military entente with Russia in 1916, and the Japanese government extended military supplies and loans to Russia in return to powers in negotiating Russia’s railroad concession in Manchuria. Suddenly everything was gone. Moreover the spread of communism to Siberia and northeast Asia posed a serious threat to Japan’s national security. If it took powers to send military expedition to Siberia, what the government of General Terauchi and the Japanese army wanted was an independent expedition of the Japanese command to support anti-Bolshevik forces. Their ultimate goal was to establish a buffer state in Siberia and the Japanese auspices. Likewise in the United States certainly there were anti-communist sentiments—Red scare. However the US declared its nonintervention policy. President Wilson continued to uphold the principle of self-determination of Russian people, which was part of his Fourteen Points. However, in the summer of 1918 Wilson changed his mind in favor of intervention. Why? This is a hotly debated question among historians. I cannot go into the details of historical debate, but simply put, Wilson was not only afraid of Japanese territorial ambition in Eastern Siberia but also afraid of Germany’s advantages and influence over the Bolsheviks in Russia. There were all kinds of rumors going on about Bolsheviks becoming German puppets. The British and the French were pressing Wilson to intervene to protect the Allied interests such as weapons and ammunitions stored within Russian territory. Eventually a contingent factor persuaded Wilson to propose a limited US-Japanese joint-military expedition to Vladivostok. This contingent factor had something to do with Czechoslovak soldiers. After the Eastern Front collapsed the Czechoslovak soldiers formally under the Tsarist Russian command were willing to continue to fight against the Central Powers, particularly Germans. On he western front in return for the Allied support of future self-determination of Czechs and Slovaks after the war. Those soldiers were in the process of being transported from eastern front to Vladivostok through the Trans Siberian Railroad and then from Vladivostok to Europe by allied ships. That was the plan. Unfortunately there were suspicions and quarrels between the Czechoslovak soldiers and the Soviet Forces along the Trans Siberian Railroad. And some fifty thousand Czechoslovak soldiers had been trapped in the middle of Siberia by the Soviet Forces. President Wilson reversed his position and
proposed a small-scale Japanese-American joint military expedition to Vladivostok with approximately seven thousand Americans and seven thousand Japanese soldiers. He emphasized that the operation was for the rescuing of Czechoslovak soldiers and the safeguarding of them. And he also proposed that the military operation should be limited within the city of Vladivostok. The irony here in retrospect is that up to that point Japanese did not send any troops to Siberia despite the army’s ambition to create a puppet state because the United States opposed sending of Japanese independent forces up to that point. Anti-interventionist faction within Japan was able to hold their grounds because of US opposition. But once President Wilson reversed his position and proposed a narrowly focused small-scale joint military expedition the interventionists in Tokyo with full approval of Premia Terauchi used the Wilson’s proposal as an excuse to launch a larger, far larger-scale military operation in Siberia. The Terauchi government made an ambiguous understanding with the United states to reserve its right to send reinforcements beyond the city limit of Vladivostok and eventually sent over seventy thousand—not seven thousand—Japanese men to northern Manchuria and Siberia. The expedition—let me quickly explain here. It's not altogether clear, but the brown arrows show how Japanese troops moved into Siberia. One group went from Korean peninsula to Port Arthur, which was Japan's leased territory and then moved through South Manchurian Railroad up north to the Trans Siberian Railroad and then moved further to the western side of Russia all the way to Yakutsk, which is at the edge of the map. Another group moved from Vladivostok to the north, northern part of Siberia. The expedition however was largely a failure to both Japan and the United States. Some Czechoslovak troops were transferred to Europe by ships, but many of them stayed and joined the counterrevolutionary Russian and successful attempt to fight against the Red Army. Many Czechoslovak soldiers became the victim of Russian civil war. President Wilson, who could not cooperate with Japan or control Japan, unilaterally decided to withdraw US troops in January 1920. Some Japanese troops stayed until 1922, but there were all kinds of atrocities between--committed between Japanese soldiers and Red Army. And there were other partisan, kind of independent forces, so it was a mess, and Japan eventually withdrew by the end of 1922. Suddenly the way Japan took advantage of the joint expedition in Siberia demonstrated Japan's aggressiveness in consolidating its foothold in Northern Manchuria and Siberian East Asia. But I also question president Wilson's unilateral attitude as part of the reason for the failure. Wilson hoped to use the limited military expedition to solve several problems. Above all he tried to forestall Japan's independent, large-scale military expedition to Siberia. But Wilson's unfamiliarity with the Japanese military and his miscalculations and miscommunication caused exactly what he wanted to avoid. He did not understand that under the Japanese constitution the military could make independent decisions, meaning independent over the civilian government during wartime. Wilson's limited joint expedition would have worked only if all parties had strict civilian control over military and were willing to use military intervention as a means to carry out non-aggressive foreign policy objectives. Also the Wilson administration's negotiations with Japan was careless and dismissive. Japan shrewdly reserved its right to send reinforcements, but Wilson either did not know about it or did not pay attention. The state department even agreed to give the expedition's high command to the Japanese army general, but the commander of the commander of the US expedition, Major General William Graves, was never informed of that communication. Naturally therefore US soldiers were resentful when Japan started to command and order around the Americans. In any case President Wilson was deeply offended by Japan's breach of faith. Later during the Paris Peace Conference, while the council of ten was deliberating whether Japan should receive the German Pacific Islands as a mandate of the League of Nations, President Wilson told his political advisor David
Hunter Miller that, I quote, "he had trusted the Japanese before. In fact they had broken their agreement about Siberia. We had to send seven thousand troops to Siberia, and they promised to send about the same number but had sent seventy thousand and occupied all the strategic points as far as Yakutsk, and that he would not trust them again." End quote. Miller's diary entry well describes the overall negative attitude of President Wilson toward Japan and its claims at the Paris Peace Conference. So let me briefly talk about peace settlement or unsettlement in 1917. Within the entire scope of the Treaty of Versailles, the showdown between President Wilson and the Japanese delegation in Paris was merely a small part of the contentious negotiations among the Allied powers who unilaterally decided peace terms and forced Germany to sign. The Council of War, the United States, Britain, France, and Italy dominated the conference. President Wilson undertook an enormous task of building a lasting peace by creating a League of Nations and fighting for his liberal peace program outlining his Fourteen Points. He had to deal with insurmountable pressure from Britain and France who wanted to punish Germany. So it was not an easy task for Wilson, not just to deal with Japan but bigger problems of Europe. As for Japan, Japanese delegation attended in a council of five. That means Japan added to the other four European powers in the council of five Japan attended only when the agenda items concerned Japanese interests. The rest Japan kept quiet--utterly silent, as a matter of fact. In the eyes of Wilson Japan was a selfish imperialist in Asia, who did not really care about world peace, so he tired to push back all Japanese claims. Japan wanted to annex all the German Pacific Islands north of the equator--the Marianas, the Carolines, the Marshalls. But because of Wilson's insistence, Japan had to be content with receiving the islands as the League of Nations see mandate. This means Japan would govern these islands on behalf of the island natives, and Japan was not allowed to construct naval bases or fortifications on these islands. The question of Shandong in China turned out to be the most contentious issue between President Wilson and the Japanese delegation. The Japanese felt President Wilson's interference in final Japanese negotiation over Shandong was humiliating because they had already secured agreements from China as well as the great powers, Britain, Japan's ally, and then France in 1915. Japan eventually saved face in Paris, barely, by securing a compromise in which Japan promised to return the Shandong peninsula in full sovereignty to China and would retain German rights and concessions in Qingdao, although Japan eventually had to return these concessions three years later at the Washington Conference. Japanese leaders considered Wilson's opposition to Japan's claims as another attempt by Western powers to block the growth of an Asian power who was aspired to become the great power of the region. And the whole experience of Shandong controversy left a bad taste in the mouth. President Wilson too was deeply disappointed by the Shandong settlement because he could not protect China's open door or its right to self-determination. But Wilson at least secured Japan's participation in the League of Nations, which he hoped would police Japan's future behavior. Japan and Wilson had one more thorny issue at Paris, which really hurt Japanese pride. Japanese leaders were seriously concerned about racial discrimination of their citizens in the United States and British dominions. At Paris, Japan proposed to include a racial equality clause in the covenant in the League of Nations. When proposal--sorry. When the proposal met firm opposition by the British dominions, Wilson chose not to support Japan's proposal for his own country's domestic problems. Eleven out of seventeen members of the League of Nations commission voted in favor of mentioning the racial quality--I'm sorry--mentioning the racial equality principle in the League's preamble, but the United States obtained. President Wilson eventually ruled that the racial equality proposal was not adopted because it did not receive unanimous approval of the commission, and that was the end of the discussion.
Forgetting the blemishes in their treatment of other Asians, the Japanese considered President Wilson’s failure to support the principle of racial equality humiliating and unjust. The Japanese could not view Wilson, Wilsonian liberal internationalism, as a universal ideal. Japanese considered them as simply an hypocritical rhetoric that hindered the advancement of their own country. The head of the Japanese peace delegation, Baron Nobuaki Makino, who later served Emperor Hirohito as lord keeper of the Privy Seal, the closest advisors to the emperor commented in his memoir about President Wilson’s unilateral approach at the Paris Peace Conference. He said that it was hard to associate Wilson's personality with democracy. The president seemed to him to be a politician best suited to a dictatorship. So at the end of WWI the relationship between the United States and Japan was far worse then when the war started. History shows that Japan aspired to become the great regional power in Asia during WWI, but the path it chose was seriously misguided, as we all know. President Wilson’s America on the other hand had a better enduring vision to achieve international peace and justice based on the ideals of freedom and democracy and internationalism. Today we are reminded daily of the importance of such moral authorities. However the question at the time of WWI, particularly in dealing with Japan—the question was how to realize these ideals in the diverse and unequal world. We need to remember that unilateral application of ideals to complex reality often comes with a price. Thank you.

(Applause)

1: It was in America’s best interest to sabotage the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which was the cornerstone of British and Japanese policy in Asia. In any future conflicts with Japan the US would risk open war with Britain, and that was one of the reason why France didn't join the war, the Russo-Japanese War, because if they did--because France was an ally of Russia, and if they had came in they would have risked war with Britain. So that was one of the reasons why I think the United States wanted to sabotage the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Do you agree?

Kawamura: I can tell you though that Anglo-Japanese alliance was always a concern for the United states because, you know, US became friendly to the British more and more throughout Nineteenth century, but still there was always that navy, you know, sea power calculation. US and Japan combined would be superior to--I'm sorry, British-Japanese navy combined would be superior to US navy. But I think that was more of a concern. I'm sorry I can’t really comment on the French kind of, you know, as a factor for US concerns. Thank you.

(Applause)

Clarke: Thank you to Professor Noriko Kawamura for an outstanding discussion and to Colonel Pritzker and the United States World War I Centennial Commission for sponsoring this program. The book is Turbulence in the Pacific: Japanese-US Relations During World War I, published by Greenwood Publishing Group. To learn more about the book, our guest, or the Museum and Library, visit in person or online at PritzkerMilitary.org. Thank you, and please join us next time on Pritzker Military Presents.

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(Theme music)

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(Theme music)
Voiceover: The preceding program was produced by the Pritzker Military Museum and Library.