

## 404 Hybrid Warfare

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(Theme music)

Voiceover: The following is a production of the Pritzker Military Museum and Library. Bringing citizens and citizen soldiers together through the exploration of military history, topics, and current affairs, this is *Pritzker Military Presents*.

Nayfeld: Welcome to *Pritzker Military Presents* with our special guests Lieutenant General Richard Natonski and Colonel Marc Warren. I'm your host Leo Nayfeld. This program is coming to you from the Pritzker Military Museum and Library in downtown Chicago and is made possible by our members. This program and hundreds more are available on demand at [PritzkerMilitary.org](http://PritzkerMilitary.org). In the past soldiers could easily identify their enemy. However times have changed, and tactics have evolved, giving rise to non-state actors and more importantly the military strategy of hybrid warfare. Today's talk will focus on the increasingly prevalent phenomenon of hybrid warfare, where law-abiding militaries confront well-armed, well-trained non-state actors who do not abide by traditional military tactics and strategies. The Hybrid Warfare Task Force was established by JINSA to articulate how actions taken by allied militaries in actual combat situations comply with and at times exceed the requirements of the law of armed conflict. The task force also seeks to focus attention on the conduct of hybrid adversaries that often intentionally exploit that same body of law to allied forces in battle and to discredit their self-defense operations in the form of public opinion. Here to speak to us are Lieutenant General Rich Natonski and Colonel Marc Warren from the Hybrid Warfare Task Force. Lieutenant General Rich Natonski has an extensive thirty-seven year history with the United States Marine Corps. As commanding officer he participated in Operations Gitmo in Cuba, in Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope in Somalia. He supported operations in Bosnia and Kuwait. Lieutenant General Natonski was present in the Pentagon during 9/11 while serving as the director of the operations division at Plans, Policies, and Operations. He deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as commanding general of the 2nd marine expeditionary brigade, and he later led at the ground assault during the second battle of Fallujah. He also ran security operations in Al Anbar Province during the Iraqi national election in 2005. In 2010 Lieutenant General Natonski retired as the most highly decorated marine on active duty. Colonel Marc Warren was the senior legal advisor for the 101st airborne division's air assault, the joint special operations command JSOC, and for the coalition forces during the invasion and occupation of Iraq. After retiring from the US Army Colonel Warren was the deputy and acting chief counsel for the FAA and is now co-chair of the aviation and aerospace practice group at Jenner and Block. Please join me in welcoming to the Pritzker Military Museum and Library Lieutenant General Rich Natonski and Colonel Marc Warren.

(Applause)

Nayfeld: I'll start it off with a broad question. We defined hybrid warfare very briefly in the introduction. Colonel Warren, could you define what hybrid warfare is and how it's different than traditional warfare as we've come to think of it.

Warren: Certainly, Leo. So hybrid warfare is warfare against an adversary that is a non-state actor but has the capabilities of a state. It has the military and the weapons capabilities of a country. But as a non-state actor it is unencumbered by being a signatory or being bound to any treaties concerning the law of war or international law generally.

Nayfeld: Would you say that all western militaries currently today face the threat of hybrid warfare in their strategies and planning?

Warren: They do, Leo, and that's what made this project by JINSA so exciting and so important because this is a study of a future war, what we call the northern war that we think is likely to be faced by Israel, but the circumstances and we think the future lessons are broadly applicable to all militaries, western militaries, democratic militaries, or any militaries that adhere to the law of war that impose discipline and restraint, values and adherence to the law on their military forces. And so the lessons of not only how the enemy will disregard the law of war, which unfortunately has become very known to General Natonski and I over the past decades in support of US military operations. It's become almost the new normal with the adversaries that we face, but more in the case of the future war, we think, that they will perversely misuse the law of war, deliberately misuse it--not just disregard it, but deliberately misuse it to their military advantage but then almost through, frankly, mischaracterization of the law of war will describe Israel as an illegal, immoral, overly aggressive adversary that disregards this law of war. And we know that's perverse because nothing could be further from the truth.

Nayfeld: Thank you, and would you talk a bit about the methodology, specifically who you met with on the fact-finding mission in Israel? Just as a bit of background we travelled to Israel this spring in April and May with a group of three recently retired US generals and two military lawyers. Two of the task force members are here with us today. But could you talk about some of the meetings that we had, the types of people and organizations that you had to provide sort of a background in focus study?

Warren: Certainly. So on our fact-finding team we had three very distinguished, very senior, and combat experienced general officers. An air force four star, a marine three star, General Natonski, and an army three star General Mike Tucker. We had two military lawyers. Each of us had experience in every combat operation dating back to Grenada. Between the two of us, we did. And we met with folks in Israel ranging from very senior political leaders, including in the attorney general's office, down to the individual soldiers at the Golan Heights and overlooking Syria and Lebanon, and in between military planners, military commanders, the various grades from general officers down to company commanders and platoon leaders. And we got a great feel for a number of things. First the operational challenges that Israel has, the security challenges, and General Natonski will speak to that. But also from my perspective as a military lawyer I came away with something--and actually it was not a new sense; it was a reinforcement having worked over the years worked with judge advocates from the IDF and gone to school with judge advocates from the IDF. But the commitment of Israel to the law of war, its consistency and adherence to its national values. And you know, adherence to the law of war is really not a matter of issuing orders, and frankly it's not a matter of lawyers being involved in combat operations, although in Israel like in the United States they are intimately and integrally involved. But it's really a matter of training, of discipline, of individual character, of national character. It's something that's inculcated in our fighting forces. And we saw as we visited not only the spirit and the practice of that but also the degree to which Israel has adopted what the United States and in particular has adopted over the years starting in the 1980s preeminently in the first Gulf War but then more in operations since then of legal constraints that exceed the requirements of the law of war. Self-constraints, self-restraints that exceed the law of war, the level of collateral damage analysis. The level of precision of targeting, the degree to which Israel very seriously takes its obligations. And here's something that's very interesting about this hybrid warfare report. I could go on and on and on about how Israel has really nearly rewritten the book, if you will, on restraint in military operations. You'd never hardly know that if you read some of the popular media, but the truth is

really deep down an a really very restrained force that takes extraordinary measures of precaution to minimize civilian casualties to try to avoid civilian casualties, who in precautionary measures do things, again that if the law of war is here--let's say this line is the requirement of the law of war, its adversaries are in the subbasement, below the subbasement. But in practice Israel has developed a fighting methodology where it actually is up here. What's interesting about the future northern war is that the pace, the level of violence, the breadth, the depth, the necessity for combined arms, tanks, artillery, infantry, special operations forces, air forces, naval forces will be such that Israel may not and likely will not be able to use many of these precautionary measures that exceed the requirements of the law of war because it will actually both put its forces at undue risk but also would be unreasonable in light of the pace of military operations and the objectives that need to be obtained. So it's a fascinating area to study. It's an important area to study, and as I said earlier it will be something that we continue to face and will face in the future in the United States.

Nayfeld: That's exactly right. And there were a number of conflicts that we could have chosen as a case study of what hybrid warfare is and the operational and legal challenges that are inherent with it. The reason we chose this specific incidence in this specific likely coming war is because Hezbollah poses a threat far greater than other groups such as ISIS and Hamas. Turning to that, because then what the law of war says, it must be pinned against what the operational nature of the threat and the combat is, General, can you talk a bit about what Hezbollah's capabilities are today? Are they similar to what they were in 2006 in the last war between Israel and Lebanon?

Natonski: As Colonel Warren talked about, Hezbollah is a hybrid enemy. It doesn't have a country like a nation-state, but it has the sophisticated weaponry. I think everyone needs to acknowledge that Hezbollah is a proxy of Iran. They will do Iran's bidding. And it's also interesting to note based on our research that Hezbollah is funded by Iran to the tune of about seven to 800 million dollars a year. Additionally they make another 200 million dollars a year through illegal activities like money laundering, counterfeiting, and the drug trade. So with this pot of money they have built a very, very sophisticated military capability. We estimate that they have between 120 and 140,000 rockets and missiles. And what's the difference? A rocket is not aimed. You point it in the general direction and hope it hits what you're aiming at. A missile nine times out of ten is gonna hit what it's aimed at. Unlike Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which essentially had just rockets, Hezbollah has rockets and missiles. It's also believed they have an underground manufacturing capability in the Bekaa Valley.

Nayfeld: And how does that quantity compare with, say, a traditional military?

Natonski: It's pretty overwhelming, because if you look at our NATO allies in Europe, Hezbollah has more rockets and missiles than they possess, so that's a substantial capability. Additionally today they have somewhere in the neighborhood of about 25,000 what we would call regular troops and another twenty to 30,000 reservists. What's unique today vice, say, ten years ago, is a lot of these troops are combat experienced. Where'd they get the experience? In Syria, fighting with Assad's regime. So it's one thing to put a fighter in that's never had the experience, but in Syria they've gained expertise on using intelligence for operations, for using combined arms ops, tanks, something we hadn't expected to see, wire guided missiles. But they've gained a lot of experience. And I think it's important also to note that Hezbollah aside from a terrorist organization, but in Lebanon they're a social organization. They provide healthcare, education for Lebanese civilians in southern Lebanon. So in effect they're winning their hearts and minds, and when they ask a Lebanese civilian, "Can we emplace a rocket or a missile inside your garage or next to your house? Can we put an arms cache in your garage?" The people support them. So that's a significant challenge. Additionally since 2006, the second

Lebanese war, they've gained more missiles. In 2006 they demonstrated they had a capability of a shore-to-ship missile, and they actually struck an Israeli patrol boat. Today they have more sophisticated missiles, but they also have a sophisticated air defense system. And they also work very closely with the Lebanese armed forces. They share intelligence, they combined joint operations, and they are also in the hierarchy of the Lebanese armed forces. And I think it's important to note that Lebanon, which is a nation-state, their parliament now has a majority of Hezbollah as of this year in charge of their parliament.

Nayfeld: And we've seen time and time again especially since 2012 when Israel's Iron Dome antimissile system became operational that with the advent of things like Iron Dome, David's Sling, Arrow, and Patriot, perhaps many people think that a missile threat isn't such a big deal anymore if it can just be shot down. Would that apply in this type of conflict, and how would Iron Dome sustain the quantity of missiles and rockets that are being fired?

Natonski: That's I think a good question, and a big takeaway I think from this report. As we look at the strategy for Hezbollah to attack Israel we envision that they will launch anywhere between a thousand to 1,500 missile and rockets a day up to three to 4,000. To put that in perspective in July and August of 2014 in the Gaza Strip Hamas would launch anywhere in the neighborhood of about 100 to 200 rockets, and the iron dome, which is a catchall phrase for all of their air defense, was able to handle that. That doesn't mean every rocket that's launched is intercepted because the system is so sophisticated that radar will detect if the rocket went awry and went towards the Mediterranean Sea. They're not gonna waste a missile shooting it down, where if it's gonna land in a field they're not gonna waste it. Now Hezbollah can overwhelm the system that the Israelis have in place. And not only that, they have missiles that can far exceed the range that can fire from southern Lebanon beyond the range of Tel Aviv. So what they will do is overwhelm the Israeli defense system, which will then force the IDF to protect, one, military forces that will have to be used to engage in ground combat operations and key infrastructure. And when I talk about key infrastructure I'm talking about the port of Haifa, which most goods come into Israel by either sea or air. There aren't any over ground routes through Egypt to Jordan or Lebanon or Syria. So they come in either by sea through Haifa or Ben-Gurion airport. They also have nuclear power plants, deionization plants, electrical grids that all have to be protected. So what does that mean? It means the Israeli population are going to go pretty much unprotected. They'll have the air raid sirens, and by code every home in Israel has a bunker room in it, and having been stationed there as a UN observer, it's basically a cinderblock room inside the center of the house. That's what they're gonna have to depend on for protection. So in event of Hezbollah missile and rocket attacks there's gonna be key damage to infrastructure and civilian casualties.

Nayfeld: And we just saw two weeks ago in the most recent flare-up on the southern front in Gaza between a Hamas and an IDF that over a period of thirty-six hours Hamas and other militant groups within the Gaza Strip fired approximately 500 rockets. There were civilian casualties wounded and injured. And this caused political turmoil within Israel as well. And it sounds like what you're saying from the north will be night and day even from what just occurred even two weeks ago. So my question is, what will the IDF have to do in order to combat this threat?

Natonski: Well, if you look at the IDF strategy, one, this is gonna be an immediate answer to any attacks on the heart of Israel. Ground forces will not sit back and wait for a while. At the onset of a conflict they will attack north. One to intercept as many of those rocket and missile launchers as possible, and two to preempt any Hezbollah attacks into Israel. And this isn't gonna be a great ground conflict on the part of Hezbollah. They're

gonna conduct raids with the express purpose of gaining a propaganda victory, killing Israel civilians, and taking hostages. So the IDF will be forced to commence immediate ground operations. Now in addition to this sophisticated set of rockets and missiles they have, Hezbollah has a sophisticated air defense system, which will interfere with the Israeli air force trying to hit targets in Lebanon. And they've over the course since 2006 in the second Lebanese war they've been developing a sophisticated defensive structure in southern Lebanon interspersed amongst the population. And they've got tunnel systems, IEDs, explosively formed projectiles, which is a terrible weapon that was used against US forces in Iraq, and anti-guided missiles, antitank guided missiles. But the intent will be for Hezbollah to cause as many casualties on the IDF as they can, and at the same time going back to what Colonel Warren talked about, civilian casualties, by interspersing their defenses amongst the civilian population, they will actually be looking at the Israelis to cause civilian casualties, which they then can exploit in the international--

Nayfeld: And we saw that to an extent when we traveled to northern Israel on an overlook into southern Lebanon. Can you talk about what the terrain looks like, what the homes look like, what's going on there, and the types of challenges that that poses to the IDF in bringing calm to its borders?

Natonski: Northern Israel and southern Lebanon, it's not flat. It's pretty hilly, and here we are in a Kibbutz on the Israeli side looking down into Lebanon, and there's a Hezbollah flag. And the buildings, I mean they look like villas. Most of them were brick construction, very sophisticated, and of course you have to wonder why are they there. It's not like it's a vacation area. But I think with the help of Hezbollah many of these Lebanese civilians have built structures that could withstand some fires from Israeli incursion, but also within that area you've got all these weapons caches, fortified areas, tunnels that are impervious from view because as we saw on the Gaza Strip we have many sophisticated systems today, unmanned aerial vehicles that can look down. But when you're operating underground you can't see. And when you're using messengers underground, you're not gonna intercept radio transmissions. So they're using techniques that will defeat some of the sophisticated technologies that we have. And these are the same types of threats that the US faces. I mean, we fought ISIS in Iraq. We see Al Qaeda. We fought them in Iraq. So these hybrid enemies, we're facing them in Africa today. So a lot of the same techniques that they use that we see Hezbollah using will be used by these other hybrid enemies.

Nayfeld: Absolutely. I think one of the takeaways that a previous taskforce that you participated on came away with, and was again found to be the case here, that these hybrid actors and hybrid forces, unlike traditional militaries they use information operations to support combat operations. The objective that these groups like Hezbollah have is to use combat operations in order to support the information campaign in order to propagate victories and casualties and make the enemy look bad in order to win in the court of public opinion. You face that yourself. We were talking about that recently, about second Fallujah probably would not have needed to occur had information and campaigns not been deployed effectively during the first Fallujah. Can you talk a bit about from your own experience?

Natonski: Yeah, I would just say up front that you can win every battle on the ground but lose the war. If you recall on March 30, 2004, four Blackwater contractors were ambushed in the city of Fallujah. They were murdered, their bodies were burned, and then their corpses were hung from a bridge that we subsequently ended up calling Brooklyn Bridge in Fallujah. That necessitated an immediate assault into the city by marines in Iraq, and they were having great success in trying to round up the perpetrators of this crime. However Al Jazeera and the insurgence in the city of Fallujah

started airing pictures of casualties--women, children dead in the streets, reporting to have been caused by the assault of marines into Fallujah. This went global. Al Jazeera helped perpetrate this, there was a call for a ceasefire, and ultimately a withdrawal from the city of Fallujah by the marines. What this led was, over the course of the next months Fallujah became an enemy sanctuary. And they were launching attacks into Baghdad, which was only forty miles to the east, to Ramadi the provincial capital. And it was a situation that couldn't be accepted with a national election coming in January of 2005, so when we went back into Fallujah in November of 2004 we had taken a lot of lessons learned. One, we got rid of--I won't say got rid of, but we encouraged the civilians in Fallujah to leave through a whispering campaign, propaganda leaflets. They knew there was a battle coming, and we tried to encourage them to leave. Fallujah, the population of Des Moines, Iowa, about 269,000. For the most part most of the civilians left. We also had ninety-two media embeds with every unit that went into the city. The only rule, they'd stay with their unit. If they wanted to get out of the city we'd take them out, but they wouldn't come back. And they reported on what they saw. And so they couldn't pull the wool over anyone's eyes. This is what the marines and the soldiers that were fighting in Fallujah did. And I think there were a number of other things. We cut power. We did a lot of things in what we call information operations in that arena that I think helped bring success to the fight for the second battle.

Nayfeld: I think we've all come to grips with the fact that the only way to successfully defeat and combat a disinformation campaign is with a multipronged education and proactive effort to educate policy makers, opinion leaders, community and business leaders, the media across the country, across the western world, about what actually takes place on the battlefield as well as what the law forbids and actually permits. We heard when we were in Israel, and it was quite disturbing to learn the reality that in 2014 fifty-day-long war in Gaza, there were about 2,000 casualties on the Palestinian side. There were about a thousand Hamas fighters and the other terrorist fighters, about a thousand civilians. We heard that that could be the casualty count in just one night in a future war in the north. So Colonel Warren, what does the law say about civilian casualties? Is it illegal? Who's the responsibility on if Hezbollah's intentionally fighting from within civilian areas?

Warren: Yeah, so, Leo, so the principles of the law of war of necessity, humanity, proportionality and distinction and increasing precaution are well known. They are historical. They have become customary law. They are known and adhered to by the IDF. They are well known and deliberately disregarded and in fact exploited by the IDF's adversaries. And the point about the information campaign not being a supporting effort of military operations but the converse is so true. And part of that is through either the deliberate ignorance or just the lack of knowledge by people who will take certain assertions by the adversary as truthful and repeat them, and among them are the idea that there has to be proportionality in military operations. No soldier, marine, or commander wants a fair fight, and there's no legal requirement to have one. And so proportionality is irrelevant when you're talking about the bringing of military force against an enemy force. Completely irrelevant. So the fact that you had one rocket launched, and then you fire artillery or bring in an air strike to hit the launcher is somehow disproportionate is absurd. Under the traditional principles of the law of war and developing law including war crimes tribunals, the standard of the soldier in the field is one of contextual reasonableness. And so to be sure, soldiers and marines in battle and their leaders, they are fatigued, they are under a great deal of stress, the anxiety level is very high, but they will go back to their training, to their discipline, and to their national values. Notwithstanding that sometimes there are mistakes, especially in a close fight like we're gonna have here with a combined arms attack. There will be a lot of

deliberate or preplanned targets where you will have intelligence analysts and lawyers huddling over maps and intelligence information and making a shoot or no-shoot decision. But the youngster on the ground and his small unit leadership will have to make the decision when he is engaged. And oftentimes what we will see both in the case of Israeli and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is that there is a criticism that under the totality of circumstances that somehow that shot should not have been taken, that that target should not have been engaged. And again sometimes there are mistakes, and those are investigated, and you try to remediate that situation. But oftentimes you have a situation where the soldier did not violate his training. He did not violate the rules of engagement. He simply misidentified or misapprehended the threat in the heat of battle and in the fog of war. You wish you could take that round back, but once it leaves you can't. And so we will see situations where there is a claim that what occurred was unreasonable, that is as disproportional because some civilian casualties occurred. First, as a general rule, civilian casualties are to be avoided, are something that we take and the IDF takes very scrupulous measures, in terms of collateral damage methodologies, to minimize civilian casualties, to weigh the casualties against the military advantage of striking an objective. But in a situation like Lebanon where the adversary has deliberately interposed military objectives--rockets, missiles, arms caches, tunnels for fighters to move from place to place within civilian locations, which by the way are looking at them as the general said reinforced concrete sophisticated structures that have no commercial or tourist or other reason to be where they are, it is the adversary that has put those civilians at risk. And the IDF, like US forces, will take great measures to try to minimize civilian casualties, but the unfortunate reality is there will be some. There will be many. But here's the difference, is the adversary deliberately as a matter of strategy wants to create civilian casualties on the Israeli side. But it gets worse, more perverse. He also wants deliberately to create casualties on his side because he can exploit those casualties, and he can put the IDF in a situation where the fact that they have lawfully targeted a military objective, gone through every methodology, every decision-making matrix, and unfortunately some civilian casualties were inevitable, or as I said earlier that there was a mistake, that there was a misidentification and a civilian casualty occurred, and exploit that as trying to demonstrate that the Israelis are callous, that the Israelis disregard the law of war, that they are overly aggressive. And going back to the information campaign, there is unfortunately for me as a practitioner, historically and incidentally now of the law of war and who takes international humanitarian law very seriously, a sad circumstance where there are people who will take it face value the fact that if there is any civilian casualty on the adversary side that that shows that there was excessive force. Well somehow except as steady state civilian casualties and say, well, there was only a few. And ten times that on the other side, or there were only a handful of IDF soldiers killed, but you know there were ten times that or five times that on the other side. Somehow that's disproportional. Well again proportionality has no relationship to military objectives and fighters, but for the civilians unfortunately war is not a mathematical ratio. And in this case if the Israeli forces have to go into Lebanon, as the General described, it will be at a historic level of violence and a historic breadth and depth and use of weapons systems. And the pace of battle will mean that some of the things we've grown accustomed to seeing with the IDF like the knock on the roof, the sub-munition that's dropped adjacent to, near a target to warn civilians that we're coming. Text messages, phone calls, use of loudspeaker teams, leaflet drops, all of that, that may be used in some circumstance in some places, but you won't have the deliberate, slow, very methodical pace, the ability to encircle, to warn, and then move to the next objective over time. This will be a fast paced operation where those kind of things are impractical. And I make a prediction: you will see

commentators who will say the failure to use some of those measures, which again if the law of war is here are on top of the roof really--no pun intended with a knock on the roof--but they're up there. But you'll see, well, the failure to use that is wrong. It violates the law. It's illegal, it's immoral, it's unethical. And you see the same phenomenon with US forces with precision-guided munitions. The fact that we have PGMs, as do the Israelis, people will advocate, increasingly advocate, you are required to use them. Well, first, having done many investigations, as has General Natonski, I will tell you that precision is relative in any event. People who talk about war being surgical, it can be maybe in some circumstances, but generally it is not. And so the idea that you have to use PGM when for example you have forces in contact and they need an effect, they need to make the bad man stop, right, suppress the enemy, there's no way in the world that reason, common sense, or military efficacy is going to say well we've got plenty of dumb bombs or we've got artillery available but I'm sorry we're not going to give your relief because we don't have a precision guided munition. Well that would be crazy. But what we're also seeing that again fascinates me is a--I think it's well intended, I think it's generally well intended--but a development in the law to move away from traditional international humanitarian law, the law of war, which in combat is *lex specialis*. It's a special law that should be applied to the general exclusion of others, and I say general because on the margins they're--not to be like a law professor, but on the margins there's a bit of overlap, but in general the *lex specialis*, the law of war, is what soldiers are trained to, what commanders and their methodologies and their rules of engagement adhere to. And there is an effort to try and undermine some that--frankly I will go ahead and say it, to neuter western armies and their war fighting capabilities, to limit weapons, to limit certain types of maneuvers, to limit for example the use of artillery in built-up areas. And it's compelling when you look at what was done in Syria where civilian population centers were shelled. That was awful, that's excessive, that is disproportional because those were civilian targets. It's inhumane. There was no military necessity. That kind of stuff should be dealt with, but to say that the rule should be so completely the case that there is no artillery allowed in built-up areas is ludicrous because frankly fires that are put into a certain location that can support maneuver may very well be very beneficial to a civilian population because they allow a threat to be neutralized in the most effective and immediate way and don't cause you to have house-to-house fighting with armored bulldozers and infantry and everything else that would be the effect if you couldn't use indirect fire in built-up areas.

Nayfeld: And I think when we met with the chief of mission for the International Committee of the Red Cross who's responsible for operating within Israel and the Palestinian territories, one of the very first things that he told our task force during his briefing was in his opinion, and you wouldn't surmise it from some of the criticism that Israel often receives, but the western world and western militaries have a lot to learn from Israel when it comes to preventing the loss of civilian life especially when it comes to precautionary measures. And the challenges you spoke of are very real, and they're made even more intense by where the enemy will be fighting from. They're not gonna be mostly out in the field operating in order to be away from civilians. In fact the opposite will take place. They'll be embedding themselves in mosques, in schools and hospitals and apartment buildings. Traditionally protected structures. And we know we spoke about it at length while we were on the ground in Israel and as we've been doing this outreach tour across the United States that a tank commander can very well know that in the one room of an apartment is a 1500-pound missile that will be launched soon into Israel, and it must be taken out. And they'll do all the precautionary measures that they can, and instead of just completely trying to level the building from the outset, they can fire a fifty-pound projectile into one corner of one room. We know though that because of

the missile that's been emplaced there, not only will the entire building go up in smoke, but perhaps the entire block will. What does the law say about fighting and attacking protected structures, as well as do they maintain their protected status when the enemy's using them to fight?

Warren: So the general rule is that civilian structures are immune from being targeted. You can't target civilians and civilian structures. However the exception is when those structures are making a contribution, a significant contribution to the enemy's war effort, and their destruction gives a military advantage that's greater than the suffering that would be caused to the civilians, and that's the notion of collateral damage. Civilian collateral damage, which is an unfortunate truism. It's a reality, especially when the adversary deliberately intermingles civilians into targets. The concept of a protected place is a heightened level of protection. And two great examples are churches and mosques and then hospitals and medical clinics. And on overlays--that is maps that are given to military forces that abide by the law of war--protected places are identified, are coded, and quite literally are prima facie off limits to advancing forces. However as General Natonski and I have sadly observed over the years fighting these types of enemies, a protected place usually means that's where you will find an artillery battery, missile launcher, enemy fighters secreted because they use that 'cause know we adhere to the law of war, and we will make sure we have a clear eyes on that shows the misuse of the protected places, that we will make a decision that the place has lost its protected status, and that we can target it. And the law of war is imminently practical, it's imminently reasonable, it preserves a modicum of humanity in the fight, it helps us retain I think our moral sense as human beings, and generally it makes a lot of sense. Why would you be indiscriminately destructive? Why would you deliberately kill civilians from a rational legal standpoint? Why would you do that? It's immoral, and it's counterproductive to whatever peace that you're trying to bring. So we go through that to determine the idea of the protected place, but when the adversary misuses the protections, Leo to answer your question, it becomes a lawful military target. And the adversary, as General Natonski observed, has become quite adept at very quickly showing photographs and film of the mosque, the clinic, the school that has some damage from a munition, and to say, well, we deliberately attacked a mosque. Well first of all that footage may not be of that mosque that's at issue in the first instance, but second of all as what they've done is pulled away the artillery pieces and missile launchers, essentially fabricating the result, but that's what goes on television. Meanwhile, and God knows in my experience in the US army, and I think the IDF is the same, that on some of this information operation campaign work that we are, however great in the field, an unarmed opponent when it comes to sophisticated information operations, which frankly has political overtones to it. So before we or the IDF will come back and will counter that kind of immediate and graphic depiction, we will say, well, first we need to find out exactly what happened. We need to do an investigation and be comfortable. We need to vet the information; we need to be accurate. And unfortunately by the time we do that, the news cycle's moved on to the next graphic video of a mosque.

Nayfeld: That's very true, and I'll ask you one question before we turn it over to the audience for Q and A as well as to those that are listening in and following on the live stream. Just in one or two sentences, I think we can all understand here that the IDF just like the United States military and the militaries of our other allies inculcate compliance with the law of armed conflict, like you said, in a variety of steps. However it's certainly not outside of the realm of possibility that you will have a commander that goes rogue or a single soldier that goes rogue, and this is different from a mistake that takes place. In your estimation from what you've seen throughout your many years in the military, do

you think that the IDF has a system just like the United States has a system to deal with that soldier or commander who goes rogue and does not adhere with the law of armed conflict?

Warren: Sure. Because I think as a military and as a nation that type of behavior is inconsistent with the values that are the very basis of the democracy, and they will investigate, and they will deal with it. And my personal experience in Iraq, I was the legal advisor when we had the Abu Gorab debacle. And that illustrates really the power of the strategic corporal in the negative sense, the fact that you could have relatively junior soldiers who commit an act of indiscipline. That was investigated, it was dealt with, but its effect was hugely magnified perhaps more by our media and our politicians than by the enemy's propaganda. But the point is that you really can't keep a secret in the military and in government despite what a lot of people think. And if there is some example of indiscipline it will be made public, and I believe that the government and the army will take steps to investigate it, to remediate it, and to say as with Abu Gorab, this is clearly wrong, and those who committed the misconduct will be held accountable.  
(Applause)

1: General Natonski, could you please comment on Hezbollah's air defense capabilities? You made reference to that in general, but could you be a little bit more specific?

Natonski: It's certainly grown since 2006. Soviet-style air defense and radars, and we've seen it in Syria. Syria is using Soviet Russian-style air defense system, and as we saw in February of this year when the Iranian republican guard corps actually launched a drone into Israel, it was shot down, Israel countered with attacks into Syria, going against a very similar air defense system and struck where that drone, the base where the drone came from and some of the command and control. I've read certainly that Russians are upgrading the Syrian system to make it a little more sophisticated. I think what you'll see in southern Lebanon is the fact that the air defense system, one, will drive Israeli aircraft up to a higher altitude. One of the first things you want in a conflict is to gain air superiority. We know that Hezbollah doesn't have aircraft, but they do have a pretty sophisticated air defense system. So Israel will strike at that air defense system. And you know, you can jam radars. They'll use a number of techniques to try to negate that capability, but the Israeli air force as we talk about operations in southern Lebanon and Lebanon per se, one, they will provide, as we talked about, combined arms operations. We talk about the Israeli ground forces attacking north with tanks, armored vehicles, infantry, artillery, but also with aviation and support, what we call close air support where a person on the ground, a forward air controller can say, "Hey, there's an enemy position here. I need you to drop a bomb on it." In 2006 one of the takeaways from the Second Lebanese War was they did that very poorly, and I think that was a big lesson learned by the Israeli defense force is the coordination between ground and aviation forces. And of course you're facing an air threat while you're doing this, so one of the big missions of the Israeli air force will be to take out the air defense system but also take out those rockets and missiles that are threatening Israel. So in a convoluted way to answer your question, it is more sophisticated, it is a threat the Israeli air force knows about, and it's one that they will address at the onset of the conflict.

Nayfeld: And they're actually training as we speak right now. There's a big drill going on within Israel to simulate and train for a two-front war, not only in the north but if a violence concurrently sparks and rises from Gaza. But one of things that the training is working on is coordination between the ground forces and air forces for things like close air support, which is so crucial and was not conducted properly and effectively in 2006.

2: Thank you. In light of the heavy casualties on both sides, what's the probability of success of a preemptive strike or against leadership or against missiles?

Nayfeld: If you could also talk, after you speak about that, if you could talk about preemption and prevention under the law as well.

Natonski: That's a tough--from a public relations perspective. There have been some attacks into Syria. Just this year because of some of the things that have transpired from Syria, i.e. the drones and some of the missiles that have been brought into Syria that have been done preemptively. But the problem that you would have I think in southern Lebanon is the Hezbollah is so interspersed amongst the civilian population I think it would not be a good story in the international press to preemptively try to attack. You're never gonna knock out 120 or 40,000 rockets and missiles because they're hidden, not to say that the Israelis don't know where some of those are, but you're also in the process of going to cause civilian casualties. Personal opinion, I think unless it's something that's deliberate and something that endangers Israel quickly, I don't see a preemptive attack, but I'll let Colonel Warren address exactly the concerns with preemption.

Warren: Yeah, so preemption is fraught with political, moral, legal policy and just gadfly commentary. But look at the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the coalition for some of the controversy that can be created by preventive war. But I will say preemptive war is lawful. It has its critics, but it's lawful. Preventive war is not. Preventive war is where you say an enemy is going to have a certain capability in the future, and I need to strike now to make sure that I blunt that capability because he's going to be a future threat. And that's unlawful. But a preemptive war is lawful under Article 51 of the United Nations charter, which recognizes self defense, and it really becomes as much a political as a legal decision, because the statement of, when a preemptive war is legal is very much along the lines of when you're faced by a fellow on the street and pulls back his fist or he reaches for a gun, and you hit him first, was that a situation where what you did was contextually reasonable? Was the threat imminent? Were you left with no choice but to act to defend yourself or to defend others? And it's the same thing with a preemptive war. As we know Israel has no chance of getting Security Council resolution authorizing it to go into Lebanon, right? That's unrealistic for political reasons. But Israel and its national leadership will have to make the decisions of the circumstances by which they can execute and then defend a preemptive war if they choose to go down that road.  
(Applause)

Nayfeld: Thank you to Lieutenant General Richard Natonski and Colonel Marc Warren for an outstanding discussion. To learn more about the Hybrid Warfare Task Force please visit [HybridWarfareTF.com](http://HybridWarfareTF.com). To learn more about the Pritzker Military Museum and Library, visit in person or online at [PritzkerMilitary.org](http://PritzkerMilitary.org). Thank you, and please join us next time on *Pritzker Military Presents*.

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