Voiceover: This program is sponsored by the United States Naval Institute.

(Theme music)

Voiceover: The following is a production of the Pritzker Military Museum and Library. Bringing citizens and citizen soldiers together through the exploration of military history, topics, and current affairs, this is Pritzker Military Presents.

(Applause)

Williams: Welcome to Pritzker Military Presents with author DM Giangreco discussing his book Hell To Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947. I'm your host Jay Williams, and this program is coming to you from the Pritzker Military Museum and Library in downtown Chicago. It's sponsored by the United States Naval Institute. This program and hundreds more are available on demand at PritzkerMilitary.org. In 1943 the United States was at a crossroads. Having one year earlier secured a major victory in the Pacific theater during the Battle of the Midway, the US military put an end to the Japanese island hopping strategy, thus limiting their effective fighting power in the theater, yet the United States and its allies had to make a decision on the best strategy to end the two-theater war swiftly and totally. With plans to eliminate Italy from the war by the end of 1943 and the implementation of Operation Overlord in Europe in 1944, the only question remaining was how to affect the Japanese surrender. Thus began Operation Downfall, which was to be a series of invasions of the Japanese home islands, came into being. In his book Hell to Pay DM Giangreco examines every aspect of Operation Downfall, relying on the large body of Japanese and American operational and tactical planning documents he unearthed in well-known and more obscure archives. These included post war interrogations and reports that senior Japanese commanders and their staffs were ordered to produce for General MacArthur's headquarters. Through such documents he is able to tell an authoritative and horrific story of what awaited both invader and defender had America's plan gone forward. This included one to four million potential US casualties dead and wounded and five to ten million Japanese fatalities, primarily civilian. As General George Marshall explained to President Harry Truman, there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory. Giangreco relies on his extensive research to counter the interpretation put forth by some historians that the United States used the atomic bomb to intimidate Russia and rather shows that President Truman's difficult decision was based on US military estimates of the enormous human costs of a conventional land and sea invasion. In his work, Giangreco presents an exhaustively researched analysis of Operation Downfall, from initial planning through its complicated legacy, to tell a through story of a fierce and costly American plan to force the Japanese to surrender and end the Second World War. DM Giangreco has lectured widely on national security matters and is an award-winning author of numerous articles on military and political subjects. He was the editor of Military Review and is the author of thirteen books including The Soldier From Independence: A Military Biography of Harry Truman and the United States Army. Please join me in welcoming DM Giangreco to the Pritzker Military Museum and Library. (Applause)

Giangreco: Thanks a bunch for coming out here tonight. I'm gonna be talking mostly about the material that is new or additional to Hell To Pay, which originally came out, oh gosh, now almost ten years ago. And there was a lot of material that I just could not meet my deadlines on to get in there, and it is what I'm gonna be principally focusing on tonight, because I'll tell you, the term "expanded edition" has a pretty checkered history. I was just a wee lad when I found out the hard way that the term "expanded edition" is all too often just a come-on by publishers to separate folks from their money by selling the
same book twice. But this is not true, however, of the new *Hell To Pay*, which does indeed expand greatly on several issues examined in the previous book and now covers three additional topics in multiple chapters, specifically the extensive and direct US support for the Soviet invasion of Manchuria; US, Soviet, and Japanese plans for the invasion and alternately defense of the northern most home island of Hokkaido; and there's also a detailed account of Operation Blacklist, almost ad hoc three-phase insertion of US occupation forces into Japan, which again it was really thrown together because quite frankly at the time they thought the war was going to be going well into '46 and possibly with subsidiary fighting into 1947. So when you have two weeks notice to, like, start the occupation, believe me it was very-- they were having a very interesting time with it. Other new material--readers of the original work may recall Douglas MacArthur's flagrant and repeated disregard of the commander's intent of his boss General George C. Marshall to put George Patton and his staff in command of US Field Army during the invasion of the Tokyo area in '46. Now revealed in this edition is that MacArthur had even devised and was in the process of implementing when the war ended the sidetracking of General Vinegar Joe Stilwell who had been picked by Marshall to lead the Tenth Army when its commander Buckner was killed on Okinawa. Additional details are also provided on the massive 1945 production of Purple Hearts as well as the decision to halt US forces on Germany's Elbe River instead of having them become embroiled in a bloody street fight in Berlin that would disrupt long planned redeployment of up to twenty divisions to the Pacific. These are all areas of interest to various scholars and history buffs, but the part of the book that has garnered the most attention, and perhaps rightfully so, are those new Russian chapters detailing the extensive and essentially still unknown degree of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union on the latter's invasion of Manchuria as well as those plans for Hokkaido. It was originally my intent that these be covered in a single chapter on the first edition, and the generous assistance offered by Larry Bland of George C. Marshall Library and Jacob Kipp of the Foreign Military Studies Group at Fort Leavenworth, they briefly encouraged me to think that I might get it done in time to meet my deadlines, but basically I was deluding myself. The matter was way too complex and ultimately dropped with only a brief and utterly inadequate account of the shifting Soviet designs against Hokkaido in a chapter in American and Japanese redeployments from respectively Europe and Manchuria. These subjects are now covered in individual chapters--seventeen, the Hokkaido Myth, and eleven, To Break Japan's Spine, which is titled after a 1944 comment of Joseph Stalin to US Ambassador Averell Harriman and Major General John R. Deane who was the chief of the US Military mission to Moscow. Little details in order here--the clearest way to get across the situation that Tsarist Russia and then the Soviet Union faced in the far east is to realize that the maritime provinces and their principle port Vladivostok were far, far more vulnerable than even the tenuous US position in the Philippines. The lifeline upon which so much depended for the Russians was the Trans Siberian Railroad, and General Deane did not mince words when describing the situation its limitations put the Soviets in. Quote: "The Trans Siberian Railroad constitutes the bobble neck in the support of military operations in Siberia. It is now double-tracked for most of its 10,000 miles, but there's still enough stretches of single-track to reduce its capacity considerably. On its eastern end the roadbed is within a few miles of the northern and eastern borders of Manchuria, and therefore it was quite vulnerable to Japanese land and air attack. It has a number of bridges and tunnels, the destruction of which would have indefinitely interrupted traffic between western Russia and the Maritime Provinces. The only other source of supply was from across the Pacific, and it was reasonable to suppose that Japan would be able to blockade that route." End quote. The vulnerabilities were so extensive that it's important to note that
the Japanese did not have to limit their attacks to the most apparent spots, and as post war studies demonstrated, they didn’t plan to. The rail line follows the giant arch of the Amur River, which forms the northern border of Manchuria for more than 1,200 miles. Along most of this distance the track runs a mere thirty to thirty-five miles from the river and as little as ten to fifteen long numerous extended stretches. Bridges and tunnels abound. Turning south the railroad flows the river valley of the Svri 250 miles towards the Vladivostok area, all while under the easy observation and reach of the Kwantung Army on the west bank. The Soviets were painfully aware of all this, and despite great efforts, the line’s capacity in relation to the maritime provinces’ increased needs had changed only marginally in the decades since the Russo-Japanese War when the railroad was blamed as a principle reason for the Russian defeat. Although the long US effort to bring the Soviet Union into the war effort against Japan followed by detailed coordination with them to ensure what they needed for a full blood theater offensive than one that was limited in nature. The Soviets throughout all of this repeatedly stressed the need for absolute secrecy lest the Japanese preempt everything by simply striking the rail line. At one point during an October 1944 meeting in Moscow when rumors of the negotiations appeared in American newspapers, Stalin personally expressed his concern to Ambassador Harriman. General Deane, by the way used the word in his own report “berated”. And Harriman sent a somewhat diplomatically sanitized account to FDR. Quote: "The need for utmost secrecy must be observed." The marshal stated that he wished to explain why he was so insistent on security and caution. If there is any indiscretion he feared that information might leak out to the press which would cause the Japanese to embark on premature adventures as a result of which the valuable Vladivostok area might be lost." Perhaps to soften the pummeling somewhat, he added, "I am a cautious old man." Almost a year before at Tehran, Stalin had surprised his western allies by opening the conference with a statement that the Soviet Union would join them in their war against Japan after Germany's capitulation. During the Moscow negotiations he reiterated that his pledge was not empty words and remarked that the US and Soviet strategic plans were in coordination. The United States would strike at the industrial heart of Japan while the Soviet Union would break the Japanese spine. Imperial forces in Manchuria, Korea, and northern China according to contemporary estimates totaled 1,200,000 men, and General Marshall had recently been briefed by joint strategic survey chief Lieutenant General Stanley D. Embick that if the United States invaded Japan before a Soviet declaration of war, quote, "a considerable part of the Kwantung’s 800,000-man army group would be transferred to the home islands and congregated against us." For obvious reasons Marshall was anxious to have the Soviets tie down the Japanese before the launch of Operation Downfall, and must have been relieved when it formed of Stalin’s belief that as soon as the Russians struck in the Manchurian/Mongolian regions that the Japanese would attempt to move troops back to Korea, and he was determined that the retreat must be cut off. In a conference held the previous day Stalin maintained that if stores could be built up now, the attack could be made two to three months after Germany’s collapse, and stated that planning should begin at once, although the Yalta and Potsdam conferences as well as all the Moscow negotiations before and between them, throughout all of that, the Soviets never deviated from this timetable which would serve as the basis for all military coordination between the two powers and an immediate jump in lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union, even though it would not be formally codified until months later at the Yalta conference the following year. Now as noted earlier Stalin was not advocating, say, a spoiling attack to force the Japanese off balance, but a knockout blow, which would require a vastly larger level of support. To launch a crushing multi-front offensive of this type so quickly after their forces defeated the Nazis in Europe, the Red Army would have to depend on
the Americans to secretly supply much, and on some fronts most, of the food, fuel, war supplies, and even the trucks to move them both before and during the offensive. At an October 17 meeting in Moscow, Harriman and Deane were presented with a breathtakingly huge wish list, which the United States moved immediately to fill under a secret expansion of the Lend-Lease Program. The program's fourth protocol as written was essentially jettisoned in midstream and its massive expansion geared towards offensive operations specifically against Japan was codenamed Milepost. By this point in the war, material designated for the final battles with the Nazis and to support the Russian population was already ordered or in the pipeline. Now Jake Kipp and General Makhmut Akhmet --you'll have to excuse my pronunciation of his middle name-- Akhmetovich Garreev, outlined the opening request to support operations against Japan. Quote: "The general staff was particularly concerned with building up sufficient stockpiles to maintain combat operations in the Far East should the maritime problems be cut off by Japanese surface, air, and submarine operations against sea lines communications with Vladivostok or by ground and air operations against the Trans Siberian Railroad." To this end, General Antonov handed to Deane a list of supplies and equipment that the Soviet Union wished to receive from the United States in order to support a theater offensive of 1,500,000 men; 3,000 tanks; 75,000 motor vehicles; and 5,000 aircraft. The list was impressive to say the least and included 230,000 tons of petroleum products, the major items being 120,000 tons of aviation gas and 70,000 tons of vehicle fuel. Next, 186,000 tons of food and fodder, the major items being 60,000 tons of flour; 20,000 tons of beans and macaroni; 25,000 tons of canned meat; and 50,000 tons of oats or barley. Next, uniform cloth was even needed. A hundred--rather 14,500 tons of clothing material and hospital supplies, the major items being 3 million meters of overcoat cloth, 4.5 million meters of uniform cloth, 12 million meters of underwear cloth, and 2 million pairs of shoes. Next, 300,000 tons of automobiles, road machines, airbase equipment and so forth, the major items being 30,000 trucks plus 1,000 duck amphibious trucks; 2,000 oil and gas tanker trucks; and 2 complete truck assembly plants. Next, 306,000 tons of railroad equipment, the major items being 500 locomotives; 3,000 boxcars; 2,000 flatcars; 1,000 tank cars; plus 800 kilometers of rails and 500 switches. Finally a flotilla of small ships and craft with major items being ten frigates, twenty corvettes, thirty minesweepers, fifty large sub chasers, and twenty large LCI troop landing craft. This by the way would later grow considerably after certain agreements at Yalta and become a separate project from Milepost. Codenamed Hula, it included the establishment of a secret base at Cold Bay in the Aleutians for the training of more than 5,000 seamen in the intricacies of operating US surface combatants. Here we see one of the LCIs, which survived the war and later came back to the United States under Lenley's provisions in the 1950s. And here we have the reflagging with Soviet and American crews of an admirable class minesweeper at Cold Bay. Soviet general staff placed the total tonnage of this initial order to be moved by sea at 160,000 tons made up of 800 and--oh, I'm sorry, 1,060,000 tons made up of 860,000 tons of dry cargo and 206,000 tons of liquid cargo, which would require a sea lift of 96 merchant freighters and 14 tankers. Soviet participation in the war was now linked to the Western Allies' vision of the endgames attrition phase. And the first ships with Milepost cargos arrived at Soviet ports before the end of 1944. Soviet requirements escalated over the next few months, and the United States put as much as much into motion as it could without compromising its own Pacific operations of incalculable value during the multi-front defensive into Manchuria, where the what ultimately amounted to 42,599 trucks including ducks; 119 tractor prime movers; 89 field repair trucks; nearly 2,500 jeeps; over ta thousand motor cycles; 336 C47s; and 50 PBY Catalina boats. American tanks also played a prominent role in the offensive, and supplementing the M4-A2 Shermans
on flatcar loads from the west were 92, shipped directly to Vladivostok, aboard liberty ships, refagged with Soviet colors to protect the fig leaf of continued Soviet neutrality. Kipp and Gareev note that these delay of these deliveries were result of intense negotiations in which Stalin sought to guarantee the success of Soviet arms and political recognition of his intended games in the Far East. For the Americans, these negotiations were matters of changing military priorities dominated by the demands of prosecuting the war against Japan to a speedy and less costly conclusion. Japanese intelligence, while aware of the transpacific ship bridge to the Soviet Far East did not note the increased volume of those ships in the last month of the war in Europe or in the months following the end of the war. And Ed Dray has written very well on this subject. As for my Hokkaido chapter, my second major addition to *Hell To Pay* involving the Soviets centers on US, Soviet, and Japanese plans for the invasion and of course the defense of Hokkaido. Now in recent years this subject has become an area of increasingly odd and uninformed speculation, engendering a host of nonsensical statements such as that, quote, "The United States Navy mined the waters off northern Japan to keep the Russians from invading first." Ah, next, "There was nothing to stop the soviet from invading before the Americans and seizing all of northern Japan," and, "Stalin was prepared to seize the northern end of Honshu. From there his armored divisions would sweep down the island to Tokyo, leaving post war Japan a divided nation like Germany."

Well, much like fantasy football, alternate history can be an enjoyable diversion from trotting and re-trotting the same old ground and sometimes provides a fruitful path to perceiving a new wrinkle in past war campaign. What's interesting about these overheard quotations though is that they were all uttered as statements of fact by educators and historians. And while these and like ideas have bubbled up for decades, virtually all of these were made relatively recently, and comments of a similar nature can be found coming and going on on the internet today. The final iteration of Soviet plans entailed landing a light force on the northernmost home island of Hokkaido with a little more than two weeks after their initial stormed into Manchuria. Unfortunately this operation is regularly characterized as a full-scale invasion instead of little more than an administrative landing coupled with a rather weak show of force. Now months earlier and shortly before the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet leadership had briefly considered the possibility of trying to conduct a major amphibious operation to seize the island. But between the essentially nonexistent assault shipping, some transportable artillery but no armor, woefully inadequate naval gunfire support and no ability to provide meaningful air cover for the operation from established bases plus the fact that the Japanese fifth area army's defenses in southern Hokkaido, though erroneously perceived to be undemanned, were known to be well developed and recently upgraded. The Soviets wisely did not include Hokkaido in their war plans. In fact the original proposal was considered so outlandish by senior party and military leaders that Field Marshal Zhukov in a meeting with Stalin referred to it not as an operation but as an escapade. US planners, when considering seizure of the relatively populous and industrialized southern portion of the island, estimated that four American infantry divisions and one armored division, with the customary lavish support, were required to get the same job done. Much later and after Tokyo had ordered its armies to lay down their arms, the Soviets adopted an operation calling only for that landing I mentioned at an isolated spot on the northwest coast, you can see on this map. But when the war ended plans were on hold for this piecemeal insertion of two 87th rifle corps infantry divisions supported by a naval infantry battalion and as many as two construction battalions. There was a third division continuing the mopping up in the Kuril Islands at that time that could eventually be made for the lodgment. It had been intended that air elements sufficient to support this latter smaller invasion be hastily deployed forward to captured airfields on Japanese Karafuto,
the southern half Sakhalin Island. The Soviet Navy support however was another matter. And the operations naval component was so pitiful that the second rifle division to land would have had to wait until the six land lease LCIs allotted the operation and a variety of slow moving vessels used in place of assault shipping--trawlers, torpedo cutters, sub chasers, some American-made minesweepers--had to wait until they returned more than 200 miles to a recently secured Sakhalin port to pick them up. Despite the obvious deficiencies in the Soviet amphibious capabilities, limitations in both manpower and material for the operation, and the likelihood that the understrength 87th rifle corps would have been easily contained by minimal force and this heavily mountainous region if the Japanese had decided to resist and disobey the emperor, a successful lodgment would nevertheless have served the wider political purposes of the Soviet government by a simple presence on Japanese soil. That is, if Washington had given a green light to the escapade, which it didn’t. Anyway it’s clear that both the Soviet Army’s intent and capabilities are being increasingly blown way out of proportion by those who have not bothered to closely study either the works of the US and Russian scholars who have written on the subject or the belligerence relevant or time planning documents and operational summaries, many of which have only become available fairly recently. Complicating matters somewhat is the fact that the two powers eyeing northern Japan, as you can see on the map, considered a variety of options that differed in both scale and objectives yet are regularly mashed together as if they were single proposed operations. In the new Hell To Pay you’ll find a brief overview of the war plans of each nation, how they evolved, and see how they fit within the context of the endgame against imperial Japan. Now, these revelations of US/Soviet operation in the new edition are only the most recent blow to revisionist contentions about the end of the war. Not that it matters to–really not that it matters to these folks. Some Truman critics have for years and indeed decades picked over the bones of every decision relating to the use of nuclear weapons against imperial Japan. Every nuance of Truman’s most casual asides have been examined, parsed, and psychoanalyzed as critics of the decision to use atomic bombs have tried to prove that the president lied when he stated that they were dropped in the hope that they would induce a defeated Japan to surrender before US forces being gathered in the Pacific from as far away as the battlefields of Germany were forced into a prolonged, bloody ground invasion. And in 1945 however, Truman and his senior military and civilian advisors had no such luxury. The clock was ticking on the invasion countdown, and George M. Elsey who worked closely with Truman throughout his presidency later remarked, “You don’t sit down and take time to think through and debate ad-nauseam all the points. You don’t have time. Later somebody can sit around for days and weeks and figure out how something might have been done differently. This is all very well and very interesting and quite irrelevant.” The later examination of Truman’s decisions was further complicated because his critics had little knowledge of military historiography and even less of the language and assumptions that are standard features of what is produced by planning staffs. For example someone promoted the idea that General Marshall’s staff believed an invasion of Japan essentially would have been a walkover, and to bolster their argument they point to highly qualified and limited casualty projections and a number of briefing documents produced in May and June of 1945, roughly half a year before Downfall's initial invasion operation. Olympic was to commence. The numbers in these documents however were not recognized for what they are, estimates of only the first thirty days. Consequently they were grossly misrepresented by individuals with little understating of how the estimates were made and exactly what they represented. In effect, it’s as if someone during WWII had come across casualty estimates for the invasion of Cicely and then declared that the numbers would represent losses for the entire Italian campaign. And then having gone
that far announced with complete certitude that the numbers actually would represent likely casualties for the balance of the war with Germany. Of course back then such a notion would be dismissed as laughingly absurd, and the flow of battle would speedily move beyond the single event the original estimates, be they good or bad, were for. And then there was the idea that the Japanese were just itching to surrender. Yeah, there were some civilian elements within Japan’s ruling circle that were determined to try to find an end to the war before the US invasion was launched. Unfortunately the militarists were in firm control of the government, and Japanese moderates had to tread gingerly for fear of arrest or assassination. In the summer of 1945 Hirohito requested the Soviets accept a special royal envoy to discuss ways in which the war might be quickly terminated, but far from a coherent plea to the soviets to help negotiate a surrender, the proposals were hopelessly vague and viewed by both Washington and Moscow as little more than a stalling tactic ahead of the Potsdam conference to prevent Soviet military intervention, an intervention that the Japanese had known was coming ever since the Soviets recent cancellation of their neutrality pact but believed would not happen until 1946. The subsequent exchange of diplomatic communications between Japan’s ambassador to the Soviet Union has been characterized by some as evidence that the country was on the brink of calling it quits. American officials reading the secretly intercepted messages between Moscow and Tokyo, however, could clearly see that the defeatist ideas of the ambassador received nothing more than stinging rebukes. The fanatical Japanese militarists retained their grip on the decision-making process until the simultaneous shocks of the atom bombs and Soviet entry into the war in August stampeded Japan's leaders into an early capitulation. Now, Max Hastings has pointed out the myth that the Japanese were going to surrender anyways has been so comprehensively discredited by modern research that it is astonishing that some writers continue to give it credence. And former chief historian of the air force Stanley Falk is amazed at those such as writers of American Prometheus Martin Sherwin and Kai Bird that they keep beating this dead horse. Well, Bird and Sherwin and people of similar mind are confident that except in rare instances they won't have to address that the horse is dead. There’s such a vast amount of material out there on this general subject area that they know most people, especially students and even those with some interest and a modest amount of time on their hands, will never be able to read it all and will functionally depend on acknowledged experts such as themselves. They believe with some justification that all they have to do is firmly maintain something and it will tend to be accepted at face value and made available to, say, students, by like thinkers, and the lazy. There's—that is also much of the reason I believe why they attempt to ignore works like, say, Hell To Pay and say works like Bob Ferrell's Truman and the Bomb that don’t follow the party line. They try to deny their foes visibility in the hope that they will be marginalized and either fade form view or better yet not be seen and considered in the first place. If the target audience doesn’t actually know that the horse is dead, they will more readily take the word of the award winning Bird, Sherwin, and Hasegawa, etcetera. Thankfully it's far harder for these fellows to pull this off now than it was in say the 70s through the mid-90s. And their efforts are increasingly reminiscent of that old Monty Python skit where the store clerk tries to sell John Cleese a dead parrot. But back to the Soviet chapters. Since the expanded edition’s publication last November, literally barely a week goes by without someone asking incredulously a question along the lines of, "How is it that this level of US/Soviet cooperation has remained unknown so long?" Not long ago Jim Hornfischer, author of The Fleet at Flood Tide, wrote to me of how easy it is to swerve into writing history from a 1980s lens. But in this particular case however the enormity of the US assistance to the invasion of Manchuria didn’t really become a part of history in the first place, unlike Lend-Lease in the war against the Nazis, which was
given great visibility and trumpeted throughout the war. Oh, convoys above the Arctic Circle valiantly fighting their way to Murmansk, trains festooned with American and Soviet flags rumbling across Iran to the Caucasus and so on. Lend-Lease aid on reflagged liberty ships to prepare Russians for their coming war with Japan was a closely guarded secret because of the extreme vulnerability to their preemptive action, even by a weakened Japan against both their sea lines and landlines of communications. And as--and you can find it if you get into the documents in detail you can find this expressed by the Russians as late as Potsdam. Anyway immediately after the war the secrecy surrounding America’s part in the Manchurian operation retained its own momentum. And besides, we had plenty to crow about that wasn’t secret. The Soviets themselves made absolutely zero mention of it, as they wanted nothing to distract from the rightful image of a magnificent achievement of Soviet arms. Yet within a relatively short period of time, knowledge of the massive US effort would have grown on its own. For example military mission chief Deane’s book The Strange Alliance was cleared in ’46 and published the following year, but increasing tensions with the Soviets were already giving more and more credence to criticisms of Yalta and Potsdam, which had begun in earnest as soon as the shooting stopped. Even before the communist victory in China and tensions had developed into a full-blown Cold War, and really long before the hot war of Korea, our direct aid in the seizure of Manchuria by Red Armies was not something that anyone in either the US or the Soviet governments, each for their own reasons, wanted to draw any attention to. And down the memory hole it went. Interestingly the defense department produced, completely out of the blue for public release, an extremely carefully crafted 107-page white paper on the joint effort in 1955. So why then? Well, the best I can come up with, ‘cause I've seen no associated documents--some of them over at that Eisenhower Library don’t really elaborate--Senator Joe McCarthy had recently been savaging George C. Marshall—he’d already been savaged for years as supposedly being responsible for the fall of China to the communists. And McCarthy’s hearings on subversives in the army had only recently concluded so the timing seems to suggest that perhaps this was done to get out of head of even more mischief by the senator. I hope I put enough qualifiers in that sentence. Anyway, vague references to the US aid from the Yalta and Potsdam conferences periodically showed up in a small number of works, but it wasn’t for more than ten long cold--ten more long Cold War years before the state department provided various relevant documents hinting at its scale in the 1966 edition of Foreign Relations of the United--in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Other stuff was buried throughout the mass of army documents declassified in the early and mid-70s. Some was made available in the relevant presidential libraries, but really by that time the narrative of the war had been long, long established. It’s too bad really because while it was a political hot potato that undoubtedly would have caused enormous grief to the Truman administration, the army, and to George Marshall in particular, a fuller understanding of the depth of US/Soviet cooperation would have effectively undercut the nonsense of Truman’s atom bomb decision and endgame in the Pacific put forward forth by Gar Alperovitz during the Vietnam period and more recently by Hasegawa in his Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. In the expanded Hell To Pay, I make it clear that the supposed race by Truman to drop atomic bombs on Japan before Stalin could enter the Pacific War, as posited by Hasegawa is completely imaginary. Both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations believed that Stalin’s entry into the war against Japan was in the interest of the United States and went to great lengths to ensure that end, which included both political guarantees and a vast quantity of supplies specifically tailored to support Soviet military operations against Japan. And as Averell Harriman noted at the time, his instructions were not only to obtain Russian
participation but also to have them give us the right kind of help and enough time to prepare to make their help effective, and that's exactly what the Soviets did. Today the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki followed by the immediate surrender of Japan continues to overshadow the Soviet declaration of war and invasion of Manchuria, but does not negate the fact that the United States fully accepted the political gains in the Far East that Stalin had sought at Yalta and locked in at Potsdam. As noted earlier after the war the results of those two conferences became a matter of grave concern to many, and that little or no effort was made to publicize either by the--publicize the US effort by either the armed services or the state department. The extent of direct US aid to Soviet military operations against their old Japanese enemy, it's like I said earlier, went down a memory hole. Now during the war itself this secrecy was of great importance. The Soviet armies in the Far East were at the end of a vulnerable, continent-long supply line, and without this dramatic increase in Lend-Lease deliveries codenamed Milepost, the massive multi-front offensive against Japan's army in Manchuria would not have been possible. It's noteworthy that Lend-Lease supplies to support the Soviets' Manchurian campaign outlined earlier by Kipp and Gareev were actually scheduled to increase even further after their declaration of war. A last point. Beyond the continued secrecy of US support long after the war a better understanding of US Soviet cooperation has also been undermined by the fact that scholars have failed to notice the key implications--the implications of a key military accord at Potsdam because of the war's early termination, which rendered its implementation unnecessary. The United States agreed to put the lives of its own sailors and airmen on the line to directly support continuing Soviet operations by forcing supply convoys through the dangerous Tsushima Strait between Korea and Japan when the marginally safer supply route above Hokkaido became closed by winter ice sometime in October. In the meantime and while the conference still had more than a week to go, the US navy issued orders to send six escort carriers to the northern Pacific to form the nucleus of Task Force 49. Its mission was to protect shipping along the northern supply route from Japanese aircraft and still potent submarine fleet when the Soviets declared war. An additional battle group of cruisers and destroyers, Task Force 92, was already clearing the area at that time, clearing the area of enemy shipping when Task Force 49 received its orders on August 8, 1945 to maintain a line of communications from the Aleutians across to the Russian port of Vladivostok. Now all of this I've run by you this evening flies in the face of the notion of a so-called race by Truman to drop atomic bombs on Japan before Stalin could enter the Pacific War. In reality though, there really was a race of sorts involving the United States and Soviet Union in the Far East. It was a race by both allies to get Red armies into the war against Japan as quickly as possible. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

1: Mr. Giaigreco, again thank you. In your book you give a pretty fair account of US staff's understanding of the vicious nature that combat would have incurred on mainland Japan. In your research did you discover any information on the training or mental preparation that was to be given to the troops who would actually go through this horrifying experience, especially those from the ETO?

Giaigreco: Well, I tell ya, it was pretty--the training that--of course, the soldiers in the Pacific were already painfully familiar with it. As the James Michener letter at the very end talks about in detail, in terms of, say--in terms of the troops that were coming over from Europe, I tell ya, their training that they were gonna be getting in the United States was pretty standardized stuff--Japanese bunkers, layouts of how defense position are made to be mutually supporting and so forth. But--and they would undoubtedly receive briefings on the vicious and very personal nature of the fighting, but really it was pretty much straight up-and-down stuff as far as the training was concerned 'cause that was
what the army was pretty much capable of doing at the time. And I really don’t think that it was gonna be—but see, they also had been training about the Germans being in particular the SS. I would say the army was doing what it thought was reasonable at the time. And while from the army’s perspective they were being as truthful as they could be, you aren’t gonna be getting that really highly personal death struggle, you know, being really driven home until you actually got out there, which is part of the reason why the divisions weren’t going out there to be—say, when you think of First Army going out there, First Army wasn’t going out there as First Army. All its divisions were basically split up among existing armies. First Army was actually gonna have more Pacific units, so they were basically—you might have a division from a—in a given quarry you might have two divisions from the Pacific and one from Europe. So they were kind of breaking it up so there was kind of a seasoning of people who did have that experience there. Yeah, First Army, which was going to be Third Army and then it was changed to First Army, that was—they were not going over there to fight as a body as First Army. Does that help any?

Williams: Thank you to DM Giangreco for an outstanding discussion, and to the US Naval Institute for sponsoring this program. The book is *Hell To Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan 1945-1947*, and it’s published by the Naval Institute Press. To learn more about the United States Naval Institute, visit usni.org. To learn more about the Pritzker Military Museum and Library, visit us in person or online at PritzkerMilitary.org. Thank you, and please join us next time on *Pritzker Military Presents*.

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(Theme music)

Voiceover: The preceding program was produced by the Pritzker Military Museum and Library.